This paper analyzes a firm's dynamic decisions: i) whether to issue a callable or non-callable bond; ii) when to call the callable bond; and iii) whether to refund it when it is called. We argue that a firm uses a callable bond to reduce the risk-shifting problem in case its investment opportunities become poor. Our empirical findings support this argument. We find that a firm facing poorer future investment opportunities is more likely to issue a callable bond than a firm facing better investment opportunities. In addition, a firm with a higher leverage ratio and higher investment risk is more likely to issue a callable bond. Finally, after a callable bond is issued, a firm with a poor performance and a low investment activity tends to call back a bond without refunding; a firm with the best performance and highest investment activity tends to call back a bond and refund its call; and a firm with mediocre performance and investment activity tends to not call its bonds.
theory" in which a callable bond allows a higher quality firm to reduce the cost associated with asymmetric information Schatzberg, 1986, 1988) . The reason is that even though a higher quality firm has to issue a bond at a lower price due to asymmetric information, it can capture the price appreciations by calling back and refunding the bond after its true quality is revealed. The third explanation is the "resolving debt overhang theory," which indicates that a callable bond allows the issuing firm to overcome the debt overhang problem, as identified by Myers (1977) . If it suffers from a debt overhang problem, a firm (acting in the interest of its equity holders) would not invest in positive NPV projects because part of the benefits from the new projects would go to the existing bond holders. One way to resolve this underinvestment problem is to allow the firm to call back its outstanding debt at the time of investment and reissue debt that reflects the improved prospects of the firm (Bodie and Taggart, 1978) . The fourth explanation, "removing restrictive covenants theory," posits that a callable bond allows a firm to remove undesirable restrictive covenants in the bond indentures so that the firm can engage in value-adding activities that are otherwise impossible (Vu, 1986) .
The last explanation is that a firm issues a callable bond to reduce the risk-shifting problem. Equity holders can expropriate wealth from bondholders by increasing the risk of the firm. Barnea et al. (1980) show that because the call option value of a callable bond declines as the firm value decreases, equity holders will have less incentive to transfer wealth. We call it the "reducing risk-shifting theory."
Our theory differs from the existing theories in two important ways. First, our theory provides an explanation for why some firms refund their called bonds but others don't. Second, our model formally studies a firm's trade-off between issuing a callable bond versus a non-callable bond.
There is a small empirical literature on callable bonds (e.g., Vu, 1986; Kish and Livington, 1992; Crabbe and Helwege, 1994; King and Mauer, 2000; Guntay, et al., 2004) . The studies provide mixed evidence for each of the five explanations that explain why a firm issues a callable bond.
Overall, we think our study makes three important contributions to the current literature. First, it derives firms' equilibrium decisions whether to issue callable bonds or non-callable bonds, when to call back the callable bonds, and whether to refund them. Secondly, it documents empirical findings that are consistent with our theory, but inconsistent with other theories. Lastly, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to examine a firm's commitment to payout cash by calling back its bond under poor performance conditions.
Theoretical analysis

Our model
For simplicity, we use a numerical example to demonstrate the main trade-off in our model. The formal analysis is available upon request. Consider a firm at the beginning of the first period in a two-period risk-neutral economy. The sequence of events is depicted in Fig. 1 and numerical analysis is presented in Table 1 . The firm has a profitable investment project to undertake immediately at Date 0. If undertaken, the firm has to invest $50 and the project will generate a fixed cash flow of $55 to the firm at the end of the first period (Date 1). The firm also has a future investment project in the second period. However, whether it will be profitable or not is uncertain at the beginning of the first period (Date 0). It is only at the end of the first period (Date 1) that the uncertainty will resolve. After the firm learns about the expected NPV of the project at Date 1, it then decides whether to invest $55 in the second period project or not. For simplicity, we assume that the risk-free rate is zero.
We assume that the manager of the firm tries to maximize the firm's equity value (for example, the manager is the owner of the firm). For simplicity, we assume that even though all agents in the economy observe the expected NPV of the second period project when the uncertainty resolves at Date 1, the project NPV is not contractible. More specifically, a contract that requires the manager to invest in the second period project only if it has a positive NPV cannot be enforced by a court. 4 The project can be in three possible states at Date 1: bad, mediocre, and good. The second period project is risky because it can yield a cash flow of either $100 or $0. If the second period project is bad, it will yield a cash flow of $100 with probability of 0.2, and a $0 cash flow with probability 0.8. If it is mediocre, the probability of a $100 cash flow is 0.7. If it is good, the probability of a $100 cash flow is 0.9. Notice that it is not efficient for the firm to invest if the project is bad because its NPV is −$35. None of the agents in the economy knows the state of the second period project at Date 0; however, they have a belief about it. They believe that the probability of a bad project is 0.25, a mediocre project is 0.5, and a good project is 0.25.
We focus on two debt financing contracts of the firm to finance the initial $50 investment: a non-callable bond maturing at the end of the second period, or a callable bond with the same maturity but is callable at the end of the first period. 5 Neither pays any coupon. We assume that the bond investors are competitive and require their investment to at least break even. We further assume that each bond holder only buys a small fraction of the bond issued. As a result, non-callable bonds cannot be bought back at Date 1 because of a hold-up problem (Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991) . We will discuss this problem in more details later. There are two factors determining the firm's financing choices: bond issuing cost and the risk-shifting cost. Bond issuing cost is assumed to be a fixed fee whenever the firm issues a new bond. That is, if the firm calls back its bond and issues a new bond to invest in the second period, it has to incur another issuing cost. We also call the issuing cost of a new bond to refinance the old one a refunding cost. Clearly, if the firm issues a non-callable bond, it will never incur the refunding cost. Risk-shifting cost will be the negative NPV incurred by the firm due to equity holders' risk-shifting incentive.
Suppose the firm issued the non-callable bond at Date 0 with a face value $80 and raised $50 to invest at Date 0. The firm has two ways to spend the $55 cash that the first period project generates at Date 1: investing in the risky second period project or investing in a risk-free T-bill. If the second period project is bad, clearly, investing in a T-bill has a higher NPV, zero. However, if the firm invests in the T-bill, it will get a cash flow of $55 at Date 2 and all the money goes to the debt holders (because the face value of the debt is $80) and the equity holders get zero. On the other hand, if the firm invests in the risky project, with 0.2 probability, the firm will generate a $100 cash flow at Date 2. In this case, the equity holders get $100 − $80 = $20; with 0.8 probability, the firm will generate $0 cash flow at Date 2. In this case, the equity holders get zero. So the equity holders get an expected payoff of $4 at Date 1 if the firm invests in the risky project. Comparing the two payoffs, equity holders are better off investing in the negative NPV risky project. This is the well-known risk-shifting problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Given that the firm will always invest in the second period project, the investors are willing to pay at Date 0 the expected payoff for the bond, which will be $50, based on the bond value of 16, 56, and 72 in bad, mediocre, and good states, respectively.
6 They just break even.
The risk-shifting problem arises because of the large amount of debt that the firm has to pay regardless of the state of the project. One obvious way to reduce this problem is for the firm to buy back or renegotiate the debt when the investment opportunity becomes worse. Unfortunately, when there is a large amount of bond holders, the firm cannot buy back the bond at Date 1 because of a hold-up problem. Suppose there are 100 bond holders and each holds 1% of the bond (face value 80/100 = 0.8). Also suppose that the firm offers the bond holders the opportunity to buy back the bond at the equilibrium price of the bond, which is 0.2 × $80 = $16. That is, each bond holder gets 0.16. If all the bond holders accept, we can check that the firm would not invest in the risky project. However, for individual bond holder, it is not optimal to accept the offer if all the other bond holders accept it. The reason is that if all the other bond holders accept the offer and the firm does not invest, the firm would have $55 − $16 = $39 cash, which is more than enough to pay the remaining bond holder the face value of his bond, 0.8. As a result, it is optimal for a bond holder to not accept the offer. This is the well-known hold-up problem in debt renegotiation (e.g., Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991, among others) . As a result, it is impossible for the firm to solve the risk-shifting problem via buying back noncallable debt in the open market, making an exchange offer, or restructuring in some other manner.
On the other hand, a carefully designed callable bond can mitigate this risk-shifting problem. If the firm issues a bond with a face value of $72.22 that is callable at Date 1 at a price of $49.44, the firm would not have an incentive to invest in the bad project. This is because investing in the bad project gives it 0.2 × ($100 − $72.22) = $5.556 but calling back the bond without investing gives it $55 − $49.44 = $5.56. 7 The callable bond thus eliminates the risk-shifting cost. However, there is a cost of the callable bond over the non-callable bond when the second period project is good at Date 1. In this state, the firm would invest in the project and thus the debt value is $72.22 × 0.9 = $65 if not called. Thus, if the firm calls back the bond at $49.33 and then refunds the debt at a cost of $4, it can save $65 − $4 − $49.44 = $11.56. Comparing it with the non-callable bond, we can see that the firm incurs an additional refunding cost of $4 in this state. We next examine the state in which the second period project is mediocre. In this state, the firm will invest because the project NPV is positive. The debt value if not called is thus $72.22 × 0.7 = $50.554. So the firm can save $50.554 − $49.44 = $1.114 by calling back the bond. But because the firm will have to refund the debt, it has to incur a refunding cost of $4. Thus, the firm is better off by not calling back the bond and refunding. Now we study the trade-off between issuing the callable and the non-callable bond at the beginning of the first period (Date 0). The expected risk-shifting cost that the firm can save by issuing a callable bond is 0.25 × ($55 − 0.2 × $100) = $8.75. The expected 6 So the expected payoff for the bond holders is 0.25 × $16 + 0.5 × $56 + 0.25 × $72 = $50. 7 We derive the call price $49.44 by making the firm just indifferent to whether or not to invest in the bad project. This is in general the best arrangement because it minimizes the firm's incentive to refund the bond at other states, thus minimizes the expected refunding cost. One can design a callable bond in this example to make the firm strictly better off calling back the bond and not investing. 8 The bond holders' expected payoff is $50 because in both good and bad state the bond value is $49.44 and in mediocre state the bond value is $50.554. So the expected payoff is 0.5 × $49.444 + 0.5 × $50.554 = $50.
extra refunding cost of the callable bond is only 0.25 × $4 = $1. It is thus optimal for the firm to issue a callable bond. 9 On the other hand, if the firm expects a better second period project in the sense that it is more likely to be good and less likely to be bad, then the trade-off may go the other way. For example, suppose the probabilities of the project being bad, mediocre, or good are 0.05, 0.5, and 0.45, respectively. If the firm issues the callable bond, the savings from risk-shifting is 0.05 × ($55 − 0.2 × 100) = $1.75, but the expected refunding cost is 0.45 × $4 = $1.8. So the firm is better off issuing a non-callable bond.
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What would happen if the firm chooses the third financing alternative: issuing a short-term straight bond in the first period? Similar to the callable bond, it will eliminate the risk-shifting problem when the project is bad. This is because the firm has to reissue a new bond at the end of the first period to invest in the second period project. Because the new bond is issued after the 9 We assume for simplicity that the first period investment always generates enough cash flow for the firm to call back its bond. Including a state at which the firm does not have enough cash to call back the bond does not change the basic results in our model. This is because in this state, the firm cannot call back the bond, thereby would invest in a negative NPV project regardless whether it issued a callable or non-callable bond. As a result, adding this state in our model does not change the trade-off between the cost and benefit of a callable and a non-callable bond. 10 Notice that so far we have assumed that the firm chooses financing alternatives to commit to maximize the total value of the firm (debt value plus equity value), rather than maximize the equity value. The reason is that the two objectives are equivalent in equilibrium. More specifically, because the bond investors are rational, they break even in equilibrium (remember that we assume that the bond investors are competitive). That is, they do not capture any value created by the firm, nor do they bear any costs -either the risk-shifting cost or the refunding cost. As a result, all the value created and the costs incurred by the firm are captured by the equity holders. Thus maximizing the total value of the firm is equivalent to maximizing the equity value in equilibrium (the details are available upon request). Table 1 Firm's investment and financing choices in the presence of a non-callable or callable bond (a numerical example). Consider a firm in a two-period risk-neutral economy. The firm has a profitable investment project to undertake at Date 0, the beginning of the first period. If undertaken, the firm has to invest $50 and the project will generate a fixed cash flow of $55 to the firm at the end of the first period (Date 1). The firm also has a future investment project in the second period. However, whether it will be profitable or not is uncertain at Date 0, and the uncertainty is resolved at Date 1. a Ex ante all agents have a common belief at Time 0 that the probability of a bad project is 0.25, a mediocre project is 0.5, and a good project is 0.25. After the manager (in the interest of equity holders) learns about the expected NPV of the project at Date 1, he then decides whether to invest the cash flow of $55 in the second period project or not. We analyze the payoffs for the firm, bond holders, and equity holders in bad, mediocre, and good state at Date 1, as well as different actions the manager undertakes, given that the firm issues a non-callable or callable bond at Date 0 that matures at Date 2. The cells highlighted in grey color are the optimal choices that the manager would undertake given various prospects of the second period project, in the presence of a non-callable or callable bond. a The project can be in three possible states at Date 1, bad, mediocre, and good. The second period project is risky because it can yield a cash flow of either 100 or 0. If the second period project is bad, it will yields a cash flow of $100 with probability of 0.2, and a $0 cash flow with probability 0.8. If it is mediocre, the probability of a $100 cash flow is 0.7. If it is good, the probability of a $100 cash flow is 0.9. It is not efficient for the firm to invest if the project is bad because its NPV is negative. b For simplicity, we assume that the risk-free rate is zero. c When the firm issues a callable bond, the firm has two more choices not listed here: 1) not call but invest in T-bill; and 2) call and refund but invest in T-bill.
However, it can be shown that they are dominated by the other choices in each state of the second period project. Therefore, we do not report the analysis of those two choices here to save space.
bond investors learn about the project, the bond will be fairly priced. As a result, the gain to the equity holders is the project NPV minus the refunding cost. The firm would thus invest in the project only if it is either good or mediocre. However, in these two states, the firm has to reissue another short-term bond to finance the second period project at an issuing cost of $4. Comparing this alternative with the callable bond, we can see that the callable bond dominates because it eliminates the risk-shifting cost while the firm needs to incur an issuing cost only when the project is good. 
Testable hypotheses
Based on our analysis, we offer the following hypotheses.
H1.
A firm expecting poorer future investment opportunities is more likely to issue a callable bond.
H2.
A firm with higher leverage is subject to greater risk-shifting problems, thus is more likely to issue a callable bond.
H3.
A firm with greater investment risk is more likely to issue a callable bond.
H4. Conditional on calling a bond, a firm with poorer performance is less likely to refund.
H5. Conditional on calling a bond, a firm with less active investments is less likely to refund.
H6.
A firm with the best performance and most active investments tends to call and refund its bonds; a firm with the poorest performance and least active investments tends to call without refund; a firm with mediocre performance and investments tends to not call at all.
H2 and H3 are not unique to our model. Both theories of solving debt overhang and reducing risk shifting suggest a positive relation between leverage and the likelihood of issuing callable bonds. The signaling theory suggests that firms suffering from more severe asymmetric information (e.g., firms with greater investment risk) are more likely to issue callable bonds. H1, H4, H5, and H6 are unique to our model since none of the existing theories offer the same empirical implications. For example, the signaling theory predicts that firms with better private information about future performance are more likely to issue callable bonds. The solving debt overhang theory predicts that firms expecting better future investment opportunities would incur higher costs of forgone investment due to debt overhang, thus would be more likely to issue callable bonds. The theory of removing restrictive covenants predicts that firms with better investment opportunities should be more likely to issue callable bonds because they would value the option to remove the restrictive covenants more. These theories all predict a positive relation between a firm's future investment opportunities and its likelihood of issuing a callable bond, which is the opposite of H1. Furthermore, the theory of reducing risk shifting in Barnea et al. (1980) is silent regarding a firm's refunding decision upon their calls, and other existing theories suggest that a firm should always refund its call. In contrast, H4 and H5 predict when a firm should refund its calls and when it shouldn't. H6 predicts when a firm would call with refund, when it would call without refund, and when it would not call at all. These four hypotheses help differentiate our theory from the others.
Data, variable construction, and descriptive statistics
Our sample of bonds
To investigate a firm's decision of issuing callable versus non-callable bonds, we obtain data on 13,784 nonconvertible fixed rate U.S. corporate bonds issued between January 1980 and December 2003 from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD). The FISD database (which is provided by LDS Global Information Services, Inc., currently owned by Mergent) contains issue-and issuer-specific information, such as coupon rate, maturity, and credit rating, on all U.S. corporate bonds maturing in 1990 or later. We use the FISD database instead of the New Issue Database of Securities Data Company (SDC) as the FISD database specifies bonds as callable or non-callable, while the SDC database does not. More importantly, we find that using information in the SDC database to infer whether a bond is callable or non-callable may not lead to accurate categorization.
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11 Another alternative is all-equity financing. We rule out this alternative because of the benefits of debt financing, e.g., tax benefits, which are not modeled in our setting. However, if we consider the tax benefits of debt financing, we have to consider the extra cost of the callable bond because when the firm calls back the bond without refunding, the firm loses its tax benefit. The loss of tax benefits will make the callable bond less favorable. But as long as the loss is not too big relative to the risk-shifting cost, which is more likely to be the case when the firm does not have many good investment opportunities, it is still optimal for the firm to issue a callable bond than a non-callable bond or equity financing. The details are available from the authors. 12 For example, Guntay et al. (2004) classify their bond sample into callable and non-callable bonds by examining the difference between the call protection period and time to maturity. They define a bond as being callable if the call protection period is less than one year, five years, seven years, or ten years as the bond will mature respectively within three to seven years, seven to ten years, ten to fifteen years, or more than fifteen years. To examine the validity of this classification, we take all the nonconvertible fixed rate bonds in the FISD being called up to year 2004, and hand match them to the bond issues from the SDC database based on issuer cusip, issuer name, issuance date, maturity dates, and coupon rate. Thirty-five percent of these bonds are actually being categorized as non-callable bonds according to the above classification scheme. In contrast, only 1% of the bonds being called in FISD are misclassified as non-called bonds in FISD. Therefore, we believe the definition of callable bonds in FISD is more reliable than the approximate classification based on the call protection period and time to maturity in the SDC database. Fig. 2 presents the distribution of all the 13,784 nonconvertible fixed rate U.S. corporate bonds over time. Callable bonds were very popular debt instruments in the 1980s, accounting for on average 70% of total public debt. The proportion of callable bonds drops significantly to only 23% in 1990s and early 2000s. The transition from high to low usage of callable bonds in early 1990s accompanies a rapid growth in bond issuance, as shown in Fig. 2 . On average, callable bonds constitute 42% of total public debt issued between 1980 and 2003. We also plot market interest rate (10-year Treasury rate) in Fig. 2 . The significant drop in the percentage of callable bond issuances is coincident with the decreasing interest rate in our sample period. This evidence is consistent with the theory of hedging interest rate risk.
After we merge the bond sample with the CRSP/Compustat database as well as excluded those bonds issued by firms without operating income beta, we lost 4554 bonds.
13 Utility and financial firms often use callable bonds to hedge interest rate exposure due to their duration gaps; however, they may not be appropriate targets for our study as we evaluate our theory on hedging investment risk. Thus we exclude 3556 bonds issued by utility firms (SIC Codes between 4800 and 4999) and financial firms (4-digit SIC Codes between 6000 and 6999). As a result, our sample is reduced to 5674 bonds. To be included in our final analysis, we require a bond with complete issue-specific information, (e.g., issue amount and S&P credit rating). Furthermore, a bond issuer must have stock prices available in the CRSP database and relevant accounting information available in the Compustat database (e.g., total assets and long-term debt). This yields a final sample of 3156 bonds issued between 1980 and 2003.
Variable construction for callable and non-callable bonds
Measuring future investment opportunities
We adopt several ex ante proxy variables to measure an issuing firm's future investment opportunities; the market/book ratio (MB), the price/earnings ratio (PE), return on assets (ROA), analyst earnings forecasts (FORECAST), and growth rate of investment ( CAPEX and CAPEXRD). Unless otherwise noted, all variables are measured as of the year ending just prior to the bond issuance date. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. Hypothesis H1 suggests that the probability of a firm issuing callable bond would be negatively related to these proxy variables of future investment opportunities. In contrast, theory of signaling, solving debt overhang, and removing restrictive covenants all predict that the likelihood of issuing callable bonds would be positively related to future investment opportunities.
Measuring leverage
Leverage is measured as the book value of either long-term debt or total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) divided by the book value of total assets. Our choice of book (rather than market) leverage is influenced by Welch (2004) , who points out that market leverage may change passively simply because of changes in stock price performance.
14 Hypothesis H2
suggests that the probability of a firm issuing callable bond would be positively related to leverage. Rating is the score of S&P rating, which is computed using a conversion process in which AAA+-rated bonds are assigned a value of 23 and D-rated bonds receive a value of 1. Leverage is measured as the book value of either long-term debt or total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) divided by the book value of total assets. Firm size is defined as the logarithm of total assets. The market/book ratio (MB) is defined as the market value of total assets (sum of book value of debt and market value of equity) divided by the book of value of equity. The price/earnings ratio (PE) is defined as stock price divided by earnings per share. ROA1 is the ratio of operating income before interest, tax, and depreciation (EBITD) and the book value of total assets. ROA2 is net income scaled by the book value of total assets. FORECAST1 is the median value of the most recent annual earnings forecasts for the forthcoming fiscal year-end provided by all analysts. FORECAST2 is the median value of the most recent annual earnings forecasts for the fiscal year-end of next year provided by all analysts. Both FORECAST1 and FORECAST2 are scaled by the year-end book value of equity. ΔCAPEX (ΔCAPEXRD) are the first difference of capital expenditures (capital expenditures plus R&D expenses) scaled by total sales. Risk-free rate is the constant-maturity Treasury bond yield from the H.15 release of the Federal Reserve System matching the maturity of each bond issue. If the maturity of a corporate bond does not match that of a Treasury bond, we linearly interpolate the Treasury rates for maturities of one, three, five, seven, ten, twenty, and thirty years. Operating income beta is the slope coefficient from a regression in which we regress the quarterly changes in operating income before depreciation normalized by total assets over the last 7 years preceding the debt issue on changes in 1-year T-bill rates. Operating income volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the first difference in quarterly earnings before interest, depreciation, and tax over the last 7 years preceding the debt issue, normalized by the average value of total assets over the same time period. Unless otherwise noted, all variables are measured as of the year ending just prior to the bond issuance date. 
Measuring investment risk
We employ several variables to proxy for investment risk, including firm size, a first-time issuer dummy, and operating income volatility. Smaller firms, first-time issuers, and firms with larger operating income volatility would have greater level of investment risk. Our hypothesis H3 suggests that the probability of a firm issuing a callable bond would be negatively related to firm size, but positively related to the first-time issuer dummy and operating income volatility.
A firm's investment risk or overall risk is also reflected in bond credit rating. RATING is the S&P credit rating score, which is computed using a conversion process in which AAA+-rated bonds are assigned a value of 23 and D-rated bonds receive a value of 1. Since credit rating may incorporate part or all of future investment opportunities, we orthogonalize this variable by regressing it against each of the variables proxied for investment opportunities, and use the residual term (Rating Residual) as the regressor in the model. 15 Hypothesis H3 suggests that the probability of a firm issuing a callable bond would be negatively related to Rating
Residual. Guntay et al. (2004) show that the choice of issuing a callable bond is positively related to the market interest rate and a firm's interest rate sensitivity of operating income. Based on this evidence, they argue that a firm uses a callable bond to hedge operating income fluctuations. To control for the confounding effects of market interest rate and a firm's operating income exposure to interest rate, we also include the risk-free rate and the operating income beta, which measures a firm's interest rate sensitivity to operating income.
Other control variables
We also include a few issue-specific variables that might affect the choice of whether to issue a callable or a non-callable bond, including time to maturity and issue size. According to the theory of hedging interest rate risk, there is a substitution effect between using a call option and shortening maturity. Thus we expected a positive relation between maturity and the probability of issuing callable bonds. In addition, larger issues are more likely to be associated with callable bonds since they create higher interest rate exposure for a firm. It is worth mentioning that our theory also suggests a positive relation between issue size and maturity, and the probability of issuing callable bonds. This is because larger issues and longer maturities would subject the issuers to greater investment risk. while the average time to maturity is approximately 13 years, suggesting a large proportion of long-term bonds in the sample. The average S&P credit rating score is 13.6, equivalent to a rating between BBB+ and BBB. Our sample seems to be filled with large companies. The average total asset of bond issuers is $7.9 billion, and their average market value is about $12 billion.
Choices of issuing a callable bond
Univariate results
In Table 3 , we examine the difference in mean and median value of issue-specific and firm-specific variables between callable and non-callable bond issues. We observe significant differences in both mean and median values of proxy variables of future investment opportunities between the two groups. Callable bonds are issued by firms with a lower market/book ratio (MB), lower Consistent with the theory of hedging interest rate risk, callable bond issuances are associated with a significantly higher interest rate. In addition, we find callable bond issuances are associated with longer maturity and smaller issue size.
Logistic regressions explaining the likelihood of issuing callable bonds
We employ logistic regressions to explore the cross-sectional relation between a firm's likelihood of issuing a callable bond and variables that proxy for future investment opportunities, leverage, and investment risk. The dependent variable in the logistic models is a binary variable equal to one for callable bonds and zero for non-callable bonds. The results are reported in Table 4 . 18 As shown in Table 4 , the explanatory power of our logit models is substantial, as evidenced by the Pseudo-R 2 exceeding 62% in each regression. The first variable of interest is market/book ratio (MB), which proxies for future investment opportunities. The coefficient estimate on MB is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in all models. This result is consistent with hypothesis H1, suggesting that firms with better future investment opportunities are less likely to issue callable bonds.
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Our theoretical analysis indicates that callable bonds could resolve the agency problem of risk shifting when a firm's future investment opportunities are poor. Hypothesis H2 suggests that a firm with a higher leverage ratio is more likely to issue a callable bond, since it is subject to a greater debt agency problem. Consistent with H2, we observe a positive and significant relation between the total leverage ratio and the probability of issuing a callable bond in model (1). To test the robustness of this leverage effect, we include in model (2) a long-term leverage ratio, and the result remains. 20 We include several variables to proxy for investment risk. Firm size is significantly negatively related to the probability of issuing a callable bond, since a larger firm is often subject to less investment risk. First-time issuers tend to be smaller firms, or firms with less experience and reputation (or access) in the public debt market. The coefficient estimate of the first-time issuer dummy is positive and significant. Operating income volatility, however, is not significantly related to the usage of a callable bond. Rating residual is negatively related to the probability of issuing a callable bond, and the coefficient estimate is highly significant. A firm with a higher credit rating residual is facing lower investment risk, and hence, it is less likely to issue a callable bond. These results support hypothesis H3: a firm with greater investment risk is less likely to issue a callable bond. Kish and Livington (1992) and Crabbe and Helwege (1994) document a significant negative relation between credit rating and the use of callable bonds.
To assess the economic impact of each variable on the choice of issuing callable bonds, we compute an odds ratio that represents the change in probability of issuing a callable bond given the change of one standard deviation of each independent variable. Change in probability for MB is −0.3564 in model (1), implying that an increase of one standard deviation in MB would decrease the probability of issuing a callable bond by 36%. 21 Change in probability for total leverage ratio and rating residual is 0.2388 and −0.5594, respectively. These results suggest an economically significant effect of future investment opportunities, leverage, and rating residual on the likelihood of issuing a callable bond. The coefficient estimate of the risk-free rate is positive and significant at the 1% level in most regressions, suggesting that interest rate risk may be a significant consideration in corporate usage of callable bonds.
22 Guntay et al. (2004) argue that if callable bonds are used for hedging interest rate risk, firms with higher interest rate sensitivity (operating income beta) would be more likely to issue callable bonds. Our evidence does not support their argument. We find that the coefficient estimates on operating income beta are mostly positive; however, they are not significant in any of the regressions. 23 Overall, our analysis offers mixed evidence with respect to the theory of hedging interest rate.
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18 To control for time and industry effects, we include in the logistic regressions dummy variables for each calendar year and each industry based on two-digit SIC Codes. 19 One might argue that MB might capture the risk aspect of a firm since a firm with high growth potential would have a large MB but also a high level of investment risk. In our logistic models, we include several variables to control for investment risk as discussed above; therefore, the relation we observe between MB and the probability of issuing a callable bond should reflect the impact of future investment opportunities rather than investment risk on the usage of a callable bond. Furthermore, since the relationship between investment risk and callable bond usage is expected to be positive, the negative relation between MB and the probability of issuing a callable bond is likely the impact of future investment opportunities that is captured by MB. 20 Kish and Livington (1992) have documented a similar result. 21 Given that the mean probability of issuing a callable bond is 14.31%, as indicated in model (1) in Table 4 , this is equivalent to an increase of unconditional probability of issuing a callable bond by 5.2%. 22 This result is consistent with the findings documented in the literature (e.g., Kish and Livington, 1992: Guntay et al., 2004) . 23 To take into account the statistical significance of the beta estimate, as in Graham and Rogers (2002) , we define an operating income exposure variable that is zero if the operating income beta is not significant at the 10% level. Otherwise, it takes the value of − 1 or + 1, depending on the sign of the coefficient. Our results are similar as we use the operating income exposure variable in the analysis. 24 To assess whether the difference between our results on operating income beta and those in Guntay et al. (2004) is driven by different sample periods, we estimate the same regression models in Table 3 of Guntay et al. (2004) based on a sample period of 1981 through 1997. The coefficient estimate of operating income beta remains insignificant. Nevertheless, the difference between our results and those in Guntay et al. (2004) might be driven by the use of different databases and/or different methods of defining a callable bond, as discussed in footnote 10.
As with Kish and Livingston (1992) , Crabbe and Helwege (1994) , and Guntay et al. (2004), we find that larger bond issues and those with longer maturities are more likely to be callable. In model (3), we replace time to maturity with duration, that is, the discount time-weighted cash flows of the bond divided by bond price, and obtain similar results. The coefficient estimate on duration is significantly positive. This finding is consistent with the theory of hedging interest rate risk. Since larger bond issues and issues with longer maturities are associated with greater interest rate risk, the issuing firm is more likely to use a callable bond to hedge interest rate risk. This finding is also consistent with our theory that longer maturity and larger issue size may be associated with greater future investment risk. Therefore, a firm would be more likely to issue a callable bond to minimize the agency problem according to H3.
Our logistic analysis above focuses on a firm that issues callable and non-callable bonds; however, the decision of whether or not to issue a bond could itself be endogenous. Hence, we investigate the possibility that our results are spuriously driven by an unobserved but nonrandom selection criterion. To test (and if necessarily correct) for selection bias, we estimate a maximum likelihood version of a Heckman (1979) selection model of regression, and the result is reported in model (4) of Table 4 . In particular, we take all the firm-year observations in the Compustat database in 1980 through 2003, and construct a dummy variable "issuing bond" based on whether or not a firm issued a bond (callable or non-callable) in a particular year as recorded in the FISD database. Then we estimate a selection probability model (results not reported) that relates the probability of issuing bonds to firm size, MB, R&D expenses (normalized by assets), proportion of tangible assets, leverage, ROA, Altman z-score, and operating income volatility. 25 These variables are chosen based on Denis and Mihov (2003) . As shown in model (4), the inverse Mills ratio from the selection probability model is only marginally significant at the 10% level. After controlling for potential selection bias, our results are robust. The selection-adjusted coefficient estimates are similar to those from model (1). In addition, to assess whether our results are driven by firm size, we divide our sample into three equal groups based on size (small, medium, and large), and a logistic regression is conducted in each sub-sample. Our results are robust in each group. The coefficient estimates on MB (measure of future investment opportunities) are significantly negative in all three sub-samples, and the magnitudes of coefficients are also comparable among groups (results available upon request).
Additional tests of hypothesis H1
To further investigate the relation between future investment opportunities and the probability of issuing callable bonds (H1), we employ several alternative ex ante measures of investment opportunities; however, regressions results are not reported but available upon request. The coefficient estimates of price/earnings ratio (PE), ROA, and analyst earnings forecasts for the forthcoming year and next year (FORECAST1 and FORECAST2) are all negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Changes in probability indicate that an increase of one standard deviation in one of these variables is associated with a decrease of the probability of issuing a callable bond by 10% to 32%. These results lend strong support for hypothesis H1.
To assess the relation between a firm's decision to issue a callable bond and its expected future investments, we also include an ex ante measure of growth in capital expenditure (ΔCAPEX) or growth in capital expenditure and R&D expenses (ΔCAPEXRD). We find that the coefficient estimates of ΔCAPEX and ΔCAPEXRD are both negative and significant (results available upon request). 25 The dependent variable for the selection model is a binary variable "issuing bond" that equals one if a firm issued a callable or non-callable bond in a given year, as recorded in the FISD database, and zero otherwise. Assuming that an ex ante growth of investment is a proxy of future investment growth, our results suggest that a firm expecting high growth in investments would be less likely to use a callable bond, since it faces less investment risk in the future. In addition to these ex ante measures of investment opportunities, we adopt a few ex post variables to proxy for investment opportunities. Based on rational expectations, observed investment opportunities should be a proxy for anticipated investment opportunities (e.g., Pilotte, 1992) . We include a few ex post variables that proxy for investment opportunities: Ex-ROA is the average ROA over the three years following bond issuance and Ex-ΔCAPEX (Ex-ΔCAPEXRD) is computed as the average of ΔCAPEX (ΔCAPEXRD) over the three years following bond issuance. The coefficient estimates of Ex-ROA, Ex-ΔCAPEX, and Ex-ΔCAPEXRD are all negative and statistically significant (results available upon request). These results further confirm that a firm is less likely to issue a callable bond when it expects future investment opportunities to be better.
Our empirical evidence on the relation between future investment opportunities and the probability of issuing callable bonds lends strong support to our hypotheses, particularly H1. In contrast, this evidence is not consistent with the alternative explanations, including the signaling theory, the theory of solving debt overhang, and removing restrictive covenants. As discussed in Section 3, these three theories all predict that firms with better future investment opportunities are more likely to issue callable bonds. Table 4 Logistic regressions explaining issuance of callable bonds. This table presents the results of logistic models in which the dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one for callable bonds and zero for non-callable bonds. Independent variables include issue-specific and firm-specific variables that proxy for firms' future investment opportunities, leverage, and investment risk. All the explanatory variables are as defined in the Appendix. Regression (4) controls for sample selection bias by estimating a MLE version of the Heckman (1979) selection model. To control for time and industry effects, we also include dummy variables for each calendar year and each industry based on two-digit SIC Code. P-values are reported in parentheses. Mean probability is the predicted probability of issuing callable bonds when all explanatory variables have their mean values. Change in probability is defines as the percentage change in the probability of issuing callable bonds when the corresponding explanatory variable is increased by one STD, and all other variables are evaluated at their means and reported in { }. 
Robustness tests on the choice of issuing callable bonds
One caveat of our results is that it does not take into account other financial contracting devices, e.g., leverage and debt maturity, which would also mitigate the risk-shifting incentive. While we have controlled for the impact of leverage and maturity in our regression models above, the control might be problematic since the choice of a callable bond is likely jointly endogenous with these "control" variables. As such, we conduct a few robustness tests to address the endogeneity issue of leverage and debt maturity.
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First we estimate a "reduced form" model that excludes Leverage and Log(Time to maturity) that are likely jointly endogenous, and the results are reported in column (1) of Table A1 . As with the results in model (1) of Table 4 , the coefficient estimate on MB is significantly negative. Firm size and Rating residual are both significantly negatively related to the probability of issuing a callable bond.
Second we estimate a system of three simultaneous equations that recognizes that both leverage and debt maturity are determined endogenously with the choice of issuing a callable bond. For the leverage and maturity equations in columns (3) and (4) respectively, we use the explanatory variables that Johnson (2003) and Billett et al. (2007) employ in their system of leverage and maturity equations. In particular, in the leverage equation we include MB (market-to-book), operating income volatility, debt maturity (prop. short-term debt), interaction term of MB and debt maturity, fixed assets, profitability, firm size, investment tax credit dummy, net operating loss carry forward dummy, and abnormal earnings. In the maturity equation, we include MB (market-to-book), leverage, operating income volatility, firm size and the square of firm size, investment tax credit dummy, net operating loss carry forward dummy, abnormal earnings, asset maturity, and rated firm dummy. In the equation explaining the choice of issuing callable bonds (column 2), we include the same set of variables used in model (1) of Table 4 , except that we include firm level debt maturity (prop. short-term debt) instead of bond maturity. Following Johnson (2003) , maturity (prop. short-term debt) is defined as the fraction of a firm's total debt that matures in 3 years or less. We define all other variables in Table A1 . Each variable is measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the bond issuance date. The system of equations is estimated by nonlinear two-stage least squares method for the pooled sample of callable and non-called bonds issued between 1980 and 2003.
After accounting for the endogenous choice of leverage and debt maturity, our results on the likelihood of issuing callable bonds as reported in Table 4 remain robust. We find that MB, firm size, and rating residual are all significantly negatively related to the probability of issuing a callable bond, which supports our hypothesis H1 and H3. Leverage remains significantly positively related to the likelihood of issuing a callable bond, supporting our hypothesis H2. 
Firms' choices of call with refund, call without refund, and not call
In addition to the implications on a firm's choice of whether to issue a callable or a non-callable bond, our model also provides explicit empirical implications on a firm's choice whether to call the bond, as well as whether to refund the call. To test those implications, we first explore that, conditional on the call events, how a firm's performance and investment activity are related to the decision on whether or not to refund the call. Second, we examine the impact of firm performance and investment activity on the firm's choices of call with refund, call without refund, and not call at all.
Choice of refunding around the call events
Our sample of bonds being called is obtained from the file called "Amount Outstanding" in the FISD. 28 To be included in our analysis, we require that a called bond have issue-specific information available in FISD (e.g., issue amount and credit rating) and relevant accounting information available in the Compustat database (e.g., total assets, long-term debt) around the call date. The analysis yields 853 bonds being called between 1983 and 2004. To measure a firm's refunding activities around a call event, we aggregate the total amount of new debt within a 12-month period surrounding the call date (i.e., six months before or six months after the call), as reported in the SDC New Issue Database. New debt includes public debt, private placements, 144A, shelf registration debt, and convertible debt. We find only 46% of firms issuing new debt in this 12-month window. 29 To define a refunding call, we follow King and Mauer (2000) and require the refunding ratio (the total amount of new debt raised within a 12-month period divided by the book value of the bonds being called) to be at least 110%. 30 Otherwise, the call event is defined as a non-refunding call. 26 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this great point. 27 The signs of the coefficient estimates on variables in the leverage and maturity equations are in general consistent with those reported in Johnson (2003) and Billett et al. (2007) . 28 This file provides the date and amount of any changes to a bond issue's amount outstanding due to various actions (e.g., part of an issue called, entire issue
called, call with an equity clawback provision). This file allows us to identify those bond issues that are entirely called back up to 2004, including call date, call price, and the amount of issue being called. We do not include bonds partially called or called with an equity clawback provision. 29 King and Mauer (2000) report that 23% of their call events in 1975-1994 are associated with raising new debt. We find a much higher percentage of refunding calls in our sample, partly due to the fact that the SDC database offers a more comprehensive coverage of new debt issuance than Moody's manuals, the Wall Street Journal Index, or LexisNexis that King and Mauer (2000) rely on to identify new financing activities. 30 The extra 10% in the refunding ratio could be thought of the residual financing activities for an average firm in a given 12-month period. Even in the absence of refunding calls, an average firm may raise some funds in the financial market on a regular basis. We employ alternative definition of refunding calls (e.g., a refunding ratio of 100% or 130%), and our results remain qualitatively the same.
Panel A in Table 5 reports descriptive statistics on our bond sample being called from 1983 to 2004. Despite the fact that only 46% of firms raise new debt within a 12-month period surrounding the call date, these firms raise about $356 million in new debt on average, which is equivalent to 3.07 times the average amount of bonds being called back. Forty percent of the call events are categorized as refunding calls since they raise new debt at least as large as 110% of the book value of the bonds. Therefore, there are a significant proportion of firms (60%) not refunding their calls.
In Panel B of Table 5 , we investigate the difference between refunding calls and non-refunding calls. For those refunding calls, the mean refunding ratio is 7.52, suggesting that many firms raised a large amount of capital within a 12-month period around the call date. Consistent with our sample construction, non-refunding calls are associated with little new debt. The mean refunding ratio is 0.075 in this group, suggesting that non-refunding firms raise on average new capital of only 7.5% of the amount of bonds being called. This raises an interesting question: Why are these firm calling back bonds without refunding? One might argue that it is not worth refunding because the interest rate does not drop enough to outweigh the refunding costs. If this is true, we would expect the change of interest rate between call date and issue date to be larger (or less negative) in the non-refunding group than that in the refunding group. As shown in Panel B of Table 5 , the mean change of interest rate between the call date and issue the date is negative in both groups; a t-test indicates that the mean change is not statistically significantly different, suggesting that an interest rate change is not the reason for a firm to not refund a call.
In Panel B of Table 5 , we also examine the credit rating of these two groups of bonds at the time when they were issued and called. When they were issued, bonds in the refunding group (average rating of BBB+) were rated two notches higher than those in the non-refunding group (average rating of BBB−); upon their calls, they basically retain their rating level. These findings are not consistent with the theories of signaling and solving the debt overhang problem, since both predict an improvement in a firm's prospects upon calling a bond (i.e., an improvement in credit rating). 31 In addition, the average number of years between the call date and the maturity date is 7.70 and 9.37 years for the non-refunding and refunding group respectively. This suggests that the call events in our sample are significant early terminations of bond maturity. While we count both public and private debt in measuring refunding activities, we do not include bank debt. If the firms in our sample refund public debt with bank debt, we may misclassify refunding calls as non-refunding. To address this issue, we examine the change of total debt in the balance sheet from before to after the call event. We find that a non-refunding firm experiences a significant decrease in total leverage (total debt divided by assets), while the refunding firm has a significant increase in leverage Refunding ratio is total amounts of new debt raised within a 12-month period divided by the book value of the bonds being called. Refund dummy is a binary variable equal to one if the refunding ratio is 110% or greater. Otherwise, the refund dummy is zero. Tangible assets are defined as property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. All other variables are as defined in the Appendix. In Panel B, we report for both refunding calls and non-refunding calls, the mean of refunding ratio, change of interest rate (maturity matched Treasury rate at call date minus Treasury rate at issue date), credit rating at issue date, credit rating at call date, the change of credit ratings between call date and issue date, and the number of years from the call date to the maturity date. T-tests are conducted to examine the null hypothesis that the mean of these two groups is the same. Crabbe and Helwege (1994) and King and Mauer (2000) also document little significant rating improvement for a sample of bonds being called in 1975-1994. (results available upon request). Further analysis indicates that the change in total leverage largely comes from long-term rather than short-term debt, indicating that our definition of refunding is accurate. As we show in our model, as a firm faces deteriorating investment opportunities, it would choose to not invest in the project and call back a bond without refunding. In contrast, when a firm has excellent investment opportunities, it would invest, call back the bond, and refund the call. Hypotheses H4 and H5 suggest that a firm with poorer performance and less active investments is less likely to refund when it calls a bond.
To test these two hypotheses, we employ logistic models to investigate the cross-sectional relation between a firm's likelihood of refunding and its performance and investment activities. The dependent variable in the logistic models is a binary variable equal to one for refunding a call and zero for not refunding a call. Explanatory variables include a measure of performance, ROA1 (EBITD/ Assets) or ROA2 (net income/assets), or a measure of investment activities, ΔCAPEX or ΔCAPEXRD. In addition, we include control variables that proxy for financing costs, including firm size, tangible assets (defined as property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets), total leverage ratio, and operating income volatility. All these explanatory variables are computed in the year-end prior to the call date. Furthermore, we include the change of interest rate and the change of credit rating between the call date and issue date to capture the potential benefit of refunding.
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The regression results are reported in Table 6 . The variables of interest are the measures of performance and investment activities. The coefficient estimates on ROA1 and ROA2 are both positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that a firm with poorer performance is less likely to refund a call. Furthermore, the growth rates of CAPEX and CAPEXRD are both significantly positively related to the probability of refunding around a call event. The evidence indicates that a poor-performing firm invests less in their project and pays out cash. Our results are also economically significant. A decrease of one standard deviation in ROA2 and the growth rates of CAPEX are associated with a decrease of 26% and 12% in the likelihood of refunding, respectively. These results support hypotheses H4 and H5.
The coefficient estimate of firm size is significantly positive in all the regressions, suggesting that a larger firm is more likely to refund a call since it incurs fewer financing costs due to its better access to the capital market and the economy of scale effect. The proportion of tangible assets is positively related to the probability of refunding around call events; however, the coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant. The coefficient estimates of total leverage ratio and operating income volatility are not statistically significant either. The change of interest rate between the call date and the issue date is not significantly related to the probability of refunding. This result is due to the inclusion of dummy variables for each calendar year. If we leave out calendar year dummy variables, the coefficient estimate on the change of interest rate becomes negative and statistically significant. This finding suggests that the lower the interest rate at the call date, the more likely a firm is to refund a call because of the benefits of refunding.
33 Change in credit rating (rating at call minus rating at issue) is not significantly related to the choice of refunding. This evidence is inconsistent with the theory of signaling and solving debt overhang problem.
Robustness tests
We conduct the following robustness checks of refunding choice. First, we restrict our sample to called bonds that are also present in our analysis of the choices of issuing callable versus non-callable bonds, and this yields 492 called bonds. 34 The logistic regression results are similar to those using the full bond sample, as reported in Table 6 . Second, most of previous studies on callable bonds are based on call events hand collected from Moody's Manuals (Vu, 1986; King and Mauer, 2000; Guntay et al., 2004) . As an alternatively sample source, we follow King and Mauer (2000) and consult Moody's Annual Bond Records, and hand collect 489 bonds called by industrial firms from 1990 to 2005. The results are similar. Another, perhaps more extreme way for a firm to reduce investment than reducing capital expenditures is asset sales. H5 suggests that a non-refunding firm is more likely to sell assets around the call event. To test this hypothesis, we collect asset sales activities from the SDC M&A database for the six months before and six months after each call event. We find support for H5: the average net asset sales (the amount of assets sold minus the amount of assets bought during the 12-months window) normalized by the amount of debt being called are significantly larger in the non-refunding group than that in the refunding group (results available upon request).
Choice to call with refund, call without refund, or not call
We next examine a firm's unconditional choices to call with refund, call without refund, or not call as its bond exits the call protection period. Hypothesis H6 suggests that the choice is not monotonic with respect to firm performance and investment activity. The best firms are more likely to call with refund. The worst firms are more likely to call without refund, while the mediocre firms are more likely to not call their bonds.
We estimate a multinomial logit model to explore the impact of a firm's performance and investment activities on the three choices of callable bonds: call with refund, call without refund, or not call. Following Denis et al. (1997) , Shumway (2001) , and King and Mauer (2009) , we start with a sample of all callable bonds in FISD. We track each callable bond starting from the year in 32 We include dummy variables for each calendar year and industry based on two-digit SIC Codes to control for the time and industry effects. 33 The benefit of refunding at a lower interest rate can be thought of as a deceased refunding cost in our model. 34 There are 53% of bonds (492) Therefore, the choices in our study are both time series and cross-sectional. An important caveat for our "not call" observations is that they might include financially distressed firms that cannot afford to call their bonds, and our model does not account for this scenario (in our model, the firm always has enough cash to call the bond without refund if it chooses to). Failure to account for the firm's inability to call would potentially bias the performance and investment activities of our "not call" sample downward. To mitigate this potential problem, we impose a simple selection filter. We restrict our sample firms to those that are present in the CRSP database at the end of 2004. Table 7 reports the results of the multinomial logit models. 37 We use the observations of "not call" as the base case and evaluate the other two outcomes (call with refund and call without refund). Models (1), (3), (5), and (7) evaluate the choices of call with refund and not call. Models (2), (4), (6), and (8) evaluate the choices of call without refund and not call. Independent variables 35 Shumway (2001) shows that such a multi-period logit model (using multiple-period data before corporate events (e.g., bankruptcy or mergers) is equivalent to a discrete-time hazard model, which produces more consistent and unbiased estimates than a static single-period logit model. 36 Since we impose this filter on all our sample firms, including those that call their bonds with refund, call their bonds without refund, and not call their bonds, it should not bias our results in any systematic way. Among 198 firms that are not present in the CRSP database at the end of 2004 and thereby excluded in our sample, 25% filed for bankruptcy by 2004. 37 Since we use panel data in Table 7 , standard errors in multinomial logit models are corrected for firm clustering effect.
include firm size, leverage ratio, tangible assets, operating income volatility, changes of interest rate and changes of credit rating between call date and issue date, STD of risk-free rate, time to maturity, and measures of firm performance and investment activities, including ROA and growth rate of capital expenditures and R&D expenses. STD of risk-free rate is the standard deviation of the 30-year Treasury bond yield in each calendar year. ROA or growth rate of capital expenditures and R&D expenses are the main variables of interest. Based on H6, we expect a positive coefficient estimate on ROA or growth rate of capital expenditures and R&D expenses in models evaluating the choice of call with refund versus not call, and a negative coefficient estimate in models evaluating the choice of call without refund versus not call. Note that because now we are comparing the two extremes cases, call with refund and call without refund, with the middle case, not call, we expect that our results to be not as strong as those reported in Table 6 , where we directly compare the two extreme cases.
As shown in Table 7 , we find significantly positive coefficient estimates on both ROA1 and ROA2 in models (1) and (3), suggesting that better performing firm is more likely to call and refund a bond rather than not call. The coefficient estimates on ROA1 and ROA2 in models (2) and (4) are both negative but only statistically significant in model (4), suggesting that a firm that is performing poorly is more likely to call a bond without a refund rather than not call. The opposite effects of firm performance on the choice of call with refund versus not call and call without refund versus not call is apparent, as predicted by H6. In models (5) and (7), the growth rates of CAPEX and CAPEXRD are both positively related to the probability of call with refund versus not call, though the relationship is only marginally significant in model (5). In contrast, the growth rates of CAPEX and CAPEXRD are negatively related to the probability of call without refund versus not call, and both results are significant. This evidence suggests that a firm with higher investment activity is more likely to call with refund than not call, but is less likely to call without refund than not call. This evidence again lends support to hypothesis H6. 
Conclusion
If a firm issues a non-callable bond, even when the firm's investment opportunity turns out to be poor, it may still have incentives to invest because of the well-known risk-shifting problem. In this paper, we propose a theory that a firm could issue a callable bond to reduce the risk-shifting problem. Because the call option enables the firm to reduce its debt obligation when its investment opportunity turns out to be poor, this makes it more attractive for equity holders to forgo the negative NPV project and repay the bond earlier. The cost to a firm of issuing a callable bond, however, is that it will have to incur a refunding cost if its investment opportunity turns out to be excellent. Therefore, a firm would trade-off between the benefit of reducing risk-shifting problem and the refunding cost, when it decides whether to issue a callable versus a non-callable bond.
Our model produces several unique empirical implications that help differentiate it from others. Our empirical findings offer strong support to our model. We find that a firm with poorer future investment opportunities is more likely to issue a callable bond. In addition, a firm with a higher leverage ratio and higher investment risk is more likely to issue a callable bond. Finally, we find that a firm with the best performance and the highest investment activity is likely to call and refund its bond; a firm with the worst performance and the lowest investment activity is likely to call without refunding its bond; and a mediocre firm is likely to not call its bond. In contrast, our findings do not seem to support the alternative theories in the literature, such as hedging interest rates risk, signaling, solving debt overhang problems, and removing restrictive covenants.
• Operating income beta is the slope coefficient obtained from the regression in which we regress the quarterly changes in operating income before depreciation normalized by total assets over the last 7 years preceding the debt issue on the changes in 1-year T-bill rates.
• Time to maturity is measured as the difference in years between the issuance date and maturity date.
• Issue amount is computed as the dollar proceeds of each bond issue.
Table A1
Robustness tests on explaining the likelihood of issuing callable bonds. Column (1) presents results of a logistical model explaining the choice of issuing callable bonds. The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one for callable bonds and zero for non-callable bonds. This model is exactly the same as model (1) in Table 4 , except we leave out independent variables Leverage and Log(Time to maturity). Columns (2) through (4) report the results of simultaneous equation regressions in which both leverage ratio and debt maturity are determined endogenously with the choice of issuing callable bonds. Leverage is the book value of total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) divided by the book value of total assets. Firm level debt maturity (prop. short-term debt) is the fraction of a firm's total debt that matures in 3 years or less. Fixed assets are the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to the book value of total assets. Profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to the book value of total assets. Firm size is net sales in millions of dollars. Asset maturity is the book value-weighted maturity of long-term assets and current assets, where the maturity of long-term assets is computed as gross property, plant, and equipment divided by depreciation expense and the maturity of current assets is computed as current assets divided by the cost of goods sold. Abnormal earnings is the difference between earnings per share in year t + 1 (excluding extraordinary items and discontinued operations and adjusted for any changes in shares outstanding) minus earnings per share in year t, divided by the year t stock price. Rated firm dummy is equal to one for firms with credit rating available in the Compustat database, and zero otherwise. All other explanatory variables are as defined in the Appendix. Each variable is measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the bond issuance date. The system of equations is estimated by nonlinear two-stage least squares method for the pooled sample of callable and non-called bonds issued between 1980 and 2003. P-values are reported in parentheses.
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